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Abstract: The 17th of September 2012 the second Metop satellite (Metop-B) was successfully launched 
from the Baikonur cosmodrome by a Soyuz/Fregat launcher. After three days of LEOP (Launch and Early 
Operations Phase), performed by ESOC, the satellite was handed over to EUMETSAT, who since then 
has being taking care of all satellite operations, including SIOV (System in Orbit Verification) of the 
platform and of the 11 instruments on-board. In order to acquire the orbit selected for operations a 
simple strategy was developed by ESOC and EUMETSAT; details on that strategy can be found in an 
ESOC paper presented on this same conference. Few challenges were identified on the foreseen SIOV 
operations for 5 possible launch dates starting from the 17th of September, which required more detailed 
analyses by EUMETSAT. This paper presents the outcomes of these analyses focused on: 
characterization of the propulsive system efficiency, acquisition of frozen eccentricity in case of large 
injection error and management of radio-frequency interferences between the two Metop satellites. A 
summary of the Flight Dynamics operations performed by EUMETSAT during Metop-B SIOV to acquire 
its operational orbit is also provided, to show how the outcome of the pre-launch analyses is applied in 
the real operations. 
 




Metop constitutes the space segment of the EUMETSAT Polar System (EPS). The EPS is the European 
contribution to a joint European-US polar satellite system called the Initial Joint Polar System (IJPS). 
EUMETSAT has the operational responsibility for the morning orbit, where the Metop-A (launched in 
2006) and Metop-B satellites are currently located, while its US counterpart, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), is responsible for the afternoon orbit, covered by the NOAA-18 
and NOAA-19 satellites. 
 
In the frame of the EPS program an in-orbit phasing separation between the two Metop satellites of 
±173.8deg is selected for the operational phase; that accounts for the given EPS system constraints (on 
data acquisition, processing and distribution) and requirements (same reference ground-track), which 
ensures at the same time maximization of data exploitation by the users. Moreover, in order to be able to 
launch at any date with no collision risk between the wo satellites, an injection orbit 16km below the 
final operational one (the same where Metop-A satellites is currently flying) was selected for Metop-B. 
 
This difference in altitude provides a large relative drift in in-orbit phasing between the two Metop 
satellites, which can be used to bring Metop-B into its target orbital location. As the orbital phase drift 
required to acquire the final in-orbit location is different for different launch dates (same in orbit-position 
at injection for Metop-B, while Metop-A positions changes every day within the 29 days repeat cycle), 
the duration of the drift phase depends on the launch date itself as well as on the injection error (a larger 
drift is induced by a lower injection altitude due to a launcher underperformance, the opposite for an 
overperformance). An adjustment of the drift may therefore be required during LEOP to make sure that 
the target in-orbit location is reached between 5 and 14 days after hand-over of operations to 
EUMETSAT, as required not to conflict with critical SIOV operations (service module routine 
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commanding initialization and attitude bias removal; instruments switch-on, out-gassing and 
decontamination); once the target is reached a drift-stop maneuver is executed during SIOV, followed by 
a touch-up maneuver on the following day to compensate for execution error of the drift-stop. 
 
2. Metop-B operational orbit acquisition strategy 
 
In order to achieve the proper local time Metop-B has to be launched exactly when the launch site 
location (Baikonur) crosses the target orbital plane; that happens once a day at ~16:28:40 UTC.  Injection 
takes place ~69 minutes after launch, so at ~17:37:45 UTC, close to the southernmost point of the orbit 
(Ref. [4]). As Metop-A flies on an orbit with 29 days of repeat cycle for 412 revolutions (14+6/29 orbits 
per day), then its in-orbit position changes depending on the selected launch date (with a repletion pattern 
of 29 days, obviously). Being the two target in-orbit positions possible for Metop-B at ±173.8deg with 
respect to Metop-A position, then the angular separation between injection and targets position for 
Metop-B also changes depending on the selected launch date. 
 
Metop-B is injected in an orbit lower (nominally 16km) than the operational one where Metop-A is 
operated; therefore an important relative drift in in-orbit position (nominally of 16.8deg/day) is observed. 
Metop-B will then get naturally, sooner or later, depending on the initial angular separation from the 
targets (depending on the launch date) and on the real orbital drift (depending on the launcher 
performance, which may cause error in the injection up to +/-8km), into its target location; at this point it 
is sufficient to perform an orbital maneuver to bring its altitude to the operational value and the drift is 
stopped. The target orbit is acquired. 
 
Unfortunately it is not possible to execute the drift-stop maneuver at any point in time, due to operation l 
constraints deriving from the platform and the instrument SIOV activities: 
1) Instrument decontamination starts 7 days after end of the LEOP phase (so-called hand-over) and 
lasts 3 weeks; no contamination is acceptable in the last 2 weeks of the decontamination and the 
longer is that period, the better; therefore the drift-stop maneuver shall be executed as soon as 
possible and in any case not later than 14 days after hand-over. 
2) Some time is needed by EUMETSAT on one side to perform initial operations on the platform 
(fine adjustment of the attitude bias of the platform to align it properly to the operational piloting 
frame), on another to properly initialize the flight dynamics and mission planning processes; two 
days are required to acquire perfect knowledge of the satellite orbit using data from the  
EUMETSAT ground stations (necessary for preparing the maneuver) and two days are needed 
between ingestion of the maneuver in the mission planning and its execution (as 37 hours of 
operations in advance are planned). Considering 1 day for the preparation of the maneuver itself, 
then the drift-stop maneuver shall be executed not earlier than 5 days after hand-over. 
 
ESOC shall therefore ensure during LEOP, by executing, if necessary, a maneuver to adjust the orbital 
drift, that the satellite reaches at least one of the two targets within the time window described here above 
(so called SIOV maneuvering window). Moreover, the following optimization criteria are imposed: 
1) Fuel consumption shall be minimized. 
2) Time to target shall be minimized; to be pursued only if not causing any fuel penalty. 
3) Radio-frequency interference with Metop-A shall be avoided; to be pursued only if not causing 
any fuel or time to target penalty; interferences are observed when Metop-B goes during the drift 
over the Metop-A orbital position (explained more in detail in paragraph 3.3). 
 
Based on the computation of the time needed by the satellite to naturally get to target (two times fortwo 
targets) it is possible to identify 4 different scenarios, depending on launch date and injection error. These 
scenarios are depicted in Fig. 1 for a nominal injection case; numerical values presented here below are 
computed for this case too: 
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A) Metop-B gets to target (for at least one of the twoargets) within SIOV maneuvering window; no 
need of performing any drift adjustment maneuver during LEOP; Metop-B from -69.8deg to 
93.9deg with respect to Metop-A position at time when ESOC maneuver is foreseen (2.5 days 
after injection); interferences observed for initial negative separation. 
B) Metop-B gets to target too early (for both targets); ESOC shall perform a maneuver to slow down 
the drift to get to target, T1 or T2, 5 days after hand over (no fuel penalty and time to target 
minimized); Metop-B from 93.9deg to 173.8deg (location of first target, T1) with respect to 
Metop-A position at time when ESOC maneuver is foreseen. 
C) Metop-B gets to target too late (for both targets); ESOC shall perform a maneuver either to 
accelerate the drift to get to the first target, T1, 14 days after hand-over (with minimal fuel 
penalty) or to reverse the drift to get to the second target, T2, 14 days after hand-over (with 
minimal fuel penalty), whatever is fuel optimal; incase both options present the same fuel 
penalty, the reverse drift one shall be preferred (as ensuring no interference); for nominal 
injection, Metop-B from -69.8deg to -173.8deg (location of second target, T2) with respect to 
Metop-A position at time when ESOC maneuver is foreseen. 
D) Metop-B gets to one target too late and to the other too early; that happens when Metop-B is 
between the two targets at time when ESOC maneuver is fo eseen; that case can be handled either 
as the B or the C (reverse drift) case. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Metop-B target acquisition scenarios 
 
More details on that subject can be found in an ESOC paper presented to this same conference (Ref. [1]) 
 
3. Overview of pre-launch analyses 
 
3.1. Characterization of the maneuver execution error 
 
In those cases when the Metop-B satellite is injected very close to its target in-orbit positions, the 
maneuver required during LEOP is very large, as the drift to be implemented is extremely small, not to 
get too early on target. It is clear that even a little error in such a large maneuver is sufficient to create a 
relatively very large error in the achieved drift and then in the time required to get to target.  
4 
 
This situation could have been observed, for instance, for a launch on the 21st of September. For that date 
the separation in in-orbit position between the Metop-B satellite at injection and the two targets is 
respectively of ~63deg and ~75.5deg. Assuming a very large underperformance (8km below the injection 
orbit, so 24km below the operational one, causing ~25.2deg/day of drift in orbital position), the separation 
at the time when ESOC performs the drift adjustment maneuver (2.5 days after injection) is ~0deg for the 
first target and of only ~12.5deg for the second one; the first target cannot be anymore reached in the 
desired time window and the second one has to be selected. A maneuver of ~11.5m/s is needed to reduce 
the drift to the value of ~2.3deg/day needed for getting into the second target not earlier than 5 days fter 
hand-over. Note that around 91% of the drift is cancelled out and that the residual drift is then quite small. 
 
An error of ~5% on that maneuver, value provided by the spacecraft manufactured as expected one for the 
first maneuver, correspond to an error of ~50% on the acquired drift: that causes an enormous error in the 
time to target: the satellites gets in target ~5.5 days later in case of overperformance and ~2 days erlier 
(only three days after hand-over) in case of underperformance. If a later time to target is selected, to 
mitigate the effect of an underperformance, then the penalty in case of under and over-performance gets 
even larger; targeting for instance 9 days after hand over, then the delay to target in case of 5% 
underperformance gets to ~4.5 days; that is still acceptable as we get in target ~4.5 days after hand-over, 
violating only marginally the 5 days constraint; however, an overperformance of 5% causes a delay of 
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Figure 2.  Target acquisition plot: evolution before propulsion characterization 
 
Detailed analyses were performed to better characterize the expected performance of the platform in case 
of maneuver execution. A model of the propulsive system was created in Matlab, taking into account: 
• Force generated by each thruster in the satellite frame as function of the tank pressure (function of 
the fuel on-board) and of the thruster alignment (taken from satellite database). 
• Torque generated by each thruster in the satellite frame as function of the force generated (bullet 
above), of the thruster location and alignment (taken from satellite database) and of the location 
of the centre of mass (reference value considered). 
• Expected off-modulation of the selected main propulsion thrusters (always two thrusters are 
commanded at the same time for propulsion, each one ge rating at the same time a torque in 
yaw) to maintain torque equilibrium in yaw. 
• Expected activation of the pitch and roll attitude control thrusters to maintain torque equilibrium 
in pitch and roll. 
 
In order to compute reliable values of the expected p rformances it is necessary to apply representative 
errors to the elements with higher uncertainty, the COM location and the thruster alignments; the errors in 
the thruster locations and were considered to be of lower importance and therefore not modeled. A normal 
distribution of the errors was then generated with these characteristics: 
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• 0.005 meters (1 sigma) in for the COM location around the reference position.  
• 0.1deg (1 sigma) for the alignment of each thruster around the reference alignment.  
 
A Montecarlo analysis was then 
performed for maneuvers in the 
velocity direction (those on which we 
are interested); for each run the 
difference between the resulting force 
and the reference propulsion force, 
generated by the activation of only the 
propulsion thrusters and assuming no 
error in any parameter, was computed. 
That difference, divided by the 
reference force, provides a direct 
measurement of the error caused by 
the activation of the attitude control 
thrusters; the resulting distribution is 
shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Distribution of propulsion force error 
 
It is interesting to notice that the resulting distribution is no more a normal one. That is linked to how the 
attitude control thrusters in pitch are mounted; both positive and negative control thrusters are nearly 
perfectly aligned with the anti-velocity direction, causing therefore a systematic underperformance in ase 
of maneuver in the velocity direction (positive direction in the satellite frame correspond to anti-velocity); 
the rate of activation of these thrusters depend on the pitch torque generated by the propulsion thruse s. It 
can be concluded that the probability of having an underperformance when performing an orbital raise 
maneuver is much larger than the one of having an overperformance. Being the reference force of around 
-18.3N, the distribution is then contained between ~4.5% underperformance (in line with the value 
provided by the satellite manufactured) and ~0.4% overperformance (one order of magnitude lower); if a 
2% underperformance is assumed a-priori that is equivalent to an execution error of only ~2.5%. 
 
That makes possible to consider strategies reducing the altitude offset with respect to the target orbit to a 
very small value with much reduced risk of having the satellite stranded with an insufficient residual drift 
in case of overperformance. Coming back to the reference case above, a 0.5% overperformance causes a 
delay to target of only of ~1 days if 9 days after hand-over is considered as time to target, absolutely 
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Figure 4.  Target acquisition plot: evolution after propulsion characterization 
 
Further optimization could be performed, if desired, to cancel out the marginal violation still observed in 
case of underperformance, thanks to the margins now available in case of the overperformance. 
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3.2. Acquisition of frozen eccentricity in case of large underperformance 
 
In those cases when the Metop-B satellite is injected quite far away from its target in-orbit positions, o 
maneuver is required during LEOP, as the natural drift is sufficient to get on target within the desired time 
window. The entire correction in semi-major axis required to acquire the operational altitude when on 
target is therefore executed during SIOV. However, even if the propulsive system would be capable to 
fully correct the altitude (the platform can execute double-burn in-plane maneuvers providing a Delta-V 
of ~6.4m/s per burn), that is not necessarily true for the eccentricity.  
 
This situation could have been observed, for instance, for a launch on the 19th of September. Assuming a 
very large underperformance (8km below the injection orbit, so 24km below the operational one) coupled 
with a relatively large error in eccentricity (up to 0.0011), then the orbit presents a relative perige  ~32km 
and a relative apogee ~16km below the nominal altitude (Clohessy-Wiltshire notation is used here, 
described in Ref. [5]). Two maneuvers respectively of ~8.4m/s and ~4.2m/s would be required to correct 
at the same time the altitude and the eccentricity. The size of the first maneuver is however outside the 
capabilities of the platform. Please note that the pr sented case is not to be considered statistically 
irrelevant (both errors close to their expected maxi um), as a strong cross-coupling can be present 
between the two errors, for instance when the under-performance is caused by an incorrect execution of 
the circularization burns performed by the Fregat module of the launcher.  
 
Two options can be foreseen: 
1) Wait for the satellite to get to the target-ground track (in the case under analysis ~11 days after 
injection), and then perform a double-burn maneuver (~6.3m/s per burn) to bring the altitude to 
the nominal value, and stopping therefore the orbital drift (drift-stop maneuver); the eccentricity 
is left unaffected (relative perigee ~8km below and relative apogee ~8km above the nominal 
altitude). On the following day perform another double-burn maneuver (~2.1m/s per burn) but 
with burns in opposite directions, in order not to m dify the altitude and to bring the eccentricity 
to the nominal value; this maneuver is also used to compensate for execution errors in the first 
maneuver (touch-up maneuver); this strategy, called drift-stop is depicted in Fig. 5. 
2) Few hours before the satellite crosses the target ground-track perform a double-burn maneuver; 
one maneuver (of ~6.4m/s) corrects as much as possible the relative perigee of the orbit (so 
~24km out of the initial ~32km) and the other one (of ~4.2m/s) corrects fully the relative apogee. 
A residual drift is created by the remaining difference in altitude (~4km), which brings the 
satellite in target after several hours: being the residual altitude offset, and then the induced 
orbital drift, much smaller (~1/6 of the initial value), a much larger time (six times more) is 
needed. When the target is reached, a single burn maneuver (of ~2.0m/s) is executed to stop the 
drift and, at the same time, acquire frozen eccentricity by fully correcting the relative perigee; this 
strategy, called dog leg, is depicted in Fig. 6; a case with 2 days time between the two maneuvers 

























































































Figure 6.  Dog-leg strategy 
 
The drift-stop strategy presents a clear fuel penalty with respect to the dog-leg one (~4.2m/s in the case 
taken into account). Furthermore, other operational consideration may also help in selecting the better 
strategy for cases not so clear (lower or no fuel penalty): 
• As the touch-up is meant to re-align the real satellite post-maneuver evolution with the one 
foreseen before the maneuver execution itself, there is normally no need of re-planning of the 
post maneuver activities to account for the drift-stop execution error. That is however true only if 
the drift-stop execution error is not so big that the maximum allowed time-difference between 
foreseen and real post-maneuver evolution is reached before the execution of the touch-up itself. 
Assuming a 2.5% error (2% underperformance taken as a-priori value, as described in paragraph 
3.1), ~10 seconds of error are accumulated before the execution of the touch-up one day later. 
That is operationally unacceptably high (normally only few seconds are tolerated); the drift-stop 
strategy is acceptable only in case a small drift-stop maneuver is needed or calibrated thrusters 
are used.  
• The need of using for the touch-up a non calibrated thruster to correct for eccentricity may 
seriously affect the accuracy of the acquisition, obliging therefore the operator to perform a 
further ground-track maintenance maneuver shortly af er the touch-up. SIOV constraints requires 
a period of around 4 to 5 weeks without maneuver after acquisition, which would be difficult to 
ensure; the drift-stop strategy is acceptable only if the size of the touch-up is small (no need to 
correct for eccentricity). 
• Due to the normally large size of the second maneuver executed in a dog-leg strategy re-planning 
before execution of the second maneuver is normally required (assuming that only one maneuver 
at a time can be handled by the mission planning system, which is the case for Metop); that forces 
to increase the time between the two maneuvers (2 days considered in the case presented above); 
acquisition of target orbit is achieved slightly later than with the drift-stop strategy. Dog-leg 
strategy is acceptable only if postponement of final orbit acquisition is acceptable. 
• The dog-leg strategy ensures a certain robustness against execution error of the first maneuver, 
which translates into a slightly earlier or later ar ival on the target ground-track and then on the 
execution time of the second maneuver. Moreover, th second maneuver is always executed with 
calibrated thrusters, ensuring good accuracy of execution and of the resulting acquisition. 
Nevertheless the drift-stop strategy presents normally better accuracy in the final acquisition as 
the touch-up is normally smaller than the second maneuver of the dog-leg. 
 
Selection of the strategy to be implemented operation lly is therefore a not so simple trade-off exercise, 
strongly depending on the orbital conditions at injection and on what was executed in LEOP. 
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3.3. Radio-frequency interferences management 
 
As the two Metop satellites are identical, radio-frequency (RF) interferences can be observed whenever 
the two satellites are too close as observed from a ground station (GS); that happens for instance when 
Metop-B is injected in an orbital position behind Metop-A and a forward drift strategy is selected (see 
scenario A and C in paragraph 2); Metop-B has to overtake therefore Metop-A, getting therefore so close 
to it that the two satellites are seen from ground at the same azimuth and elevation. These interferenc s 
may jeopardize the capability of safely operating both satellites at the same time. 
 
Several interference cases can be identified during LEOP: 
1) The TM of both satellites is received at the same ti e in a LEOP GS; that happens whenever 
Metop-A as seen from a LEOP GS has an angular separation lower than 3.0deg from Metop-B; 
Metop-B TM is jammed by Metop-A TM and LEOP operato, ESOC in this case, is blind. This 
case is considered of high criticality as endangeri the operations of the satellite in LEOP. 
2) The TM of both satellites is received at the same time in a EUMETSAT GS; this case is 
symmetrical to the one above and EUMETSAT is blind. This case is considered of low criticality, 
as TM for the Metop-A satellite can be safely collected from the stream multiplexed in the X-
band downlink, containing the instrument data.  
3) The telecommand carrier sent to Metop-A from a EUMETSAT GS is received also by Metop-B; 
that happens whenever Metop-B as seen from a EUMETSAT GS has an angular separation lower 
than 3.2deg from Metop-A. This case is considered of high criticality if Metop-B is in visibility of 
a LEOP GS; any carrier sent to Metop-B from the LEOP GS would be unlocked by the carrier 
from the EUMETSAT GS and any on-going commanding would be interrupted, endangering the 
operations of the satellite in LEOP. Being the EUMETSAT prime GS located in Svalbard and 
two of the LEOP GS being in Alaska and in Kiruna, that is nearly always the case.  
4) The telecommand carrier sent to Metop-B from a LEOP GS is received also by Metop-A; this 
case is symmetrical to the one above and EUMETSAT commanding may be affected. This case is 
considered of low criticality, as Metop-A disposes of around 36 hours of on-board autonomy.  
5) The ranging tone sent back by Metop-A to a EUMETSAT station performing ranging is also 
received by a LEOP station while performing ranging on Metop-B; that happens whenever 
Metop-A as seen from the LEOP GS has an angular separation lower than 22deg from Metop-B. 
The reason why interference in ranging can be observed with such a large angle is that range 
measurements are much more sensitive to external perturbation than TM or telecommands: a 
small parasitic signal can be easily filtered out by the TM receiver in the station or by the on-
board transponder as is done with the noise (signal close to noise), but may still cause a large 
error in the timing measurement of the ranging tone (signal added to noise). Again, due to the 
large overlap in visibility between the LEOP GS and the prime EUMETSAT GS, concurrent 
ranging is the most current case. This case is considered of high criticality as ranging data are of 
paramount importance during a LEOP.  
6) The ranging tone sent back by Metop-B to a LEOP GS performing ranging is also received by a 
EUMETSAT GS while performing ranging on Metop-A; this case is symmetrical to the one 
above and EUMETSAT ranging may be affected; This case is considered of low criticality, as 
Metop-B disposes of GPS data for orbit determination.  
 
It is clear that, in order to implement adequate oprational countermeasures it is necessary to have an as 
clear as possible picture of the possible interferences in the future. For this reason a dedicated tool was 
developed within the Flight Dynamics system. That tool takes as input the operational orbit of the two
Metop satellites and computes, for all the GS identifi d, the following: 
A) Interference events, defined as the time intervals during which the estimated angular separation 
(as seen from the considered GS) is below a given threshold (which could be station dependent); 
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S-band (a single event is sufficient to cover both TM and tele-command interference, being the 
two thresholds very similar) and ranging interferenc  events are considered during LEOP. 
B) Interference period, defined as the interval between th  start of the first interference event and the 
end of the last one. 
C) Clean visibility events, defined as the intervals within the interference period where a spacecraft 
is seen from a GS without interference with the other satellite. These events are computed for 
selected GS (nominally the EUMETSAT ones) and for a given satellite (nominally Metop-A). 
 
The following operational rules can therefore be derived: 
• Whenever an S-band interference event on a LEOP GS is identified, Metop-A S-band transponder 
must be muted, to mitigate the risk from interference case (1); moreover it is recommended to not 
to perform commanding on Metop-A, to avoid the problems deriving from interference case (4). 
• Whenever an S-band interference event on a EUMETSAT GS is identified, on-ground operation 
requiring telecommand carrier to be sent to Metop-A must be suspended, to mitigate the risk from 
interference case (3); moreover it is recommended to mute Metop-A S-band transponder, to avoid 
the problems deriving from interference case (2). 
• Whenever a ranging interference event on a LEOP GS is identified, ranging on Metop-A must be 
suspended, to mitigate the risk from interference case (5). 
• Whenever a ranging interference event on a EUMETSAT GS is identified, it is recommended to 
suspend ranging on Metop-A, to avoid the problems deriving from interference case (6). 
 
It can be noted that, if the recommended actions are h ndled as mandatory, then the actions to be taken 
are identical, regardless of the GS on which the int rference event is detected. Furthermore, it is also
recommended to minimize the number of mute and un-mte operations on the S-band transponder. In 
terms of operations therefore the following procedur s were implemented: 
• Metop-A transponder is muted before the start of the S-band interference period and un-muted 
(via time-tagged telecommand sent before muting the transponder) after its end. 
• Metop-A on-ground operations requiring telecommand carrier to be sent to Metop-A are 
suspended before the start of the S-band interferenc  period and resumed after its end; 
commanding is automatically suspended in the same time interval. 
• Metop-A ranging operation are suspended before the start of the ranging interference period and 
resumed after its end. 
• Clean visibility events of sufficient duration can be used for resuming S-band operations within 
the S-band interference period in case of need; note that interference events are normally at the 
beginning and at the end of a pass, as the angular sep ration as seen from a ground station at these 
points in time is much smaller than at maximum elevation, for a given in-orbit separation between 
the two satellites. 
 
In order to ensure the operational feasibility of that strategy, it is necessary to evaluate the expected 
duration of the interferences periods for the nominal jection case (16km below the operational orbit) 
and for degraded cases within the expected launcher performances (+/-8km error). As a real risk of 
interference was observed for a launch on the 18th of September, detailed computation of the duration of 
these interferences was performed and the results are hown in Tab. 1 (values in talics represent cases 
where the interference lasts up to the end of the LEOP; that time is considered as end time). 
 
As expected the duration increases the smaller is the separation in altitude from the operational orbit (so 
in case of an overperformance of the launcher); however, even the maximum duration for the S-band 
interference period is well below the satellite autonomy of 36 hours. 
10 
Table 1.  Duration of interferences for different injection errors 
Injection altitude error (km) 
and equivalent sigma 
Duration of S-band 
interferences (hours) 
Duration of ranging 
interferences (hours) 
-8.0 (-3sigma) 3.58 26.01 
-5.3(-2sigma) 5.23 27.37 
-2.7(-1sigma) 5.32 33.82 
0.0 6.43 39.75 
+2.7(+1sigma) 8.57 47.06 
+5.3(+2sigma) 8.74 50.60 
+8.0(+3sigma) 13.06 45.35 
 
As we have seen, the countermeasures in place are strongly based on the capability to mute the Metop-A 
S-band transponder during the interference period. However, if the Metop-A satellite enters safe-mode, 
then the backup on-board computer switches autonomously the S-band transponder on and it is no longer 
possible to switch it off. The only way to avoid S-Band interference in this scenario is then to request 
ESOC to mute Metop-B transponder. Moreover, whenever Metop-A enters safe-mode it is mandatory to 
perform commanding and ranging as soon as possible to maximize the probability of saving the mission 
(or minimize the risk of loosing it). ESOC should then suspend commanding and ranging operations on 
Metop-B. A special agreement was prepared in this direction and dedicated procedures were developed 
by ESOC to be able to react as expected. 
 
The problem above described is however particularly severe if S-band interferences are observed on the 
first 12 hours of the LEOP, while critical operations are carried out for Metop-B; in this case to ask ESOC 
to suspend what they are doing may mean the loss of the Metop-B satellite; just imagine what would 
happen if operations have to be suspended before it has been possible to fully deploy the solar array. The 
initial launch date was selected in such a manner to nsure that no S-band interferences are observed the 
first 12 hours of LEOP as well as for the following 3 days (possible further launch attempts). For the 18th 
of September S-band interferences start after 22 hours in the worst case, that is considered still acceptable. 
Risk of interferences within the first 12 hours is observed on the 13th of September, whereas on the 8th of 
September interferences start already at injection; those dates and the three before were therefore 
considered as forbidden for launch. 
 
If we can try to minimize, or even cancel, the risk of having interferences during LEOP on 4 consecutive 
dates (even if it was not the case at the end, as interferences on LEOP were observed on the second day of 
the campaign), it is impossible to avoid that during the SIOV. This situation was expected for a launch on 
the 19th and 20th of September. The main differences between interference management during LEOP and 
SIOV is that during SIOV both satellite are operated by EUMETSAT using the same GS network and that 
another RF band is to be considered, the X-band, used for instrument data download (no X-band is on 
during LEOP of a satellite) X-band interference events are also computed by the Flight Dynamics tool 
above described, taking as angular separation threshold 0.5deg. It is therefore necessary not only to mute 
the S-band transponder on one of the two satellites during S-band interferences, but also to mute the X-
band transponder on the other satellite during X-band interferences (if both transponders are muted on the 
same satellite then we have no more visibility on its TM at all). The baseline considered was to maintain 
X-band on Metop-A, not to affect the operational mission and S-band and ranging on Metop-B. 
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4. Metop-B operational orbit acquisition operations 
 
4.1. Selection of acquisition strategy and LEOP maneuver 
 
As explained in paragraph 2, the selection of the acquisition strategy for Metop-B depends on the 
launcher performance and on the launch-date. The orbital separation between the injection in-orbit 
position and the two possible targets was, for a launch on the 17th of September, respectively of ~123deg 
and ~135.5deg. The launcher provided ~3km of overperformance (injection ~13km below nominal 
altitude), therefore causing a drift of ~13.5deg/day. The two targets were reached respectively ~6 days 
and ~7 days after hand-over, perfectly in line with requirements. Moreover the inclination was so close t  
the selected one that no inclination correction wasnecessary. 
 
Two options were evaluated during LEOP: 
1) Do not perform any maneuver and leave the satellite dr ft naturally and then stop the drift once on 
target (first target selected to have operations completed as soon as possible) using a dog-leg 
strategy, being the thrusters not calibrated (as explained in paragraph 3.2) 
2) Perform a small IP maneuver to calibrate the thruste s, but not modifying in a significant manner 
the time required to get to target, and then stop the drift once on target using a drift-stop strategy 
(as explained in paragraph 3.2). 
 
The goal was to select on one side the strategy permitting to complete the acquisition of the operational 
orbit as early as possible (to start as early as possible SIOV activities on final orbit), on another to 
minimize the error in ground-track during the following 5 weeks of SIOV (to maximize the reliability of 
the collected data). At the same time it was considere  as operationally beneficial to synchronize the 
execution of the maneuver with the routine update of the satellite telecommand, executed daily at ~13:00 
UTC, not to have to modify the routine operational schedule. 
 
As explained in paragraph 3.2, if a dog-leg strategy is selected, it is necessary to foresee 2 days of time 
between the execution of the first and the second maneuver to allow synchronizing the mission planning 
between the two maneuvers; at the same time it is necessary to ensure that the second maneuver is not too 
big to avoid violation of the operational dead-band (5km wide) during the SIOV. Assuming a 1% error on 
that maneuver (calibrated thrusters would used), that implies a second maneuver not larger than the 1/8 of 
the entire required Delta-V (~6.8m/s); the first maneuver would have then to be executed ~6 hours before 
the nominal crossing time of the target ground-track nd the second maneuver ~42 hours afterwards. 
 
If a drift-stop strategy is implemented then the touch-up is required ~24 hours after the drift-stop (time 
needed to calibrate the drift-stop and re-plan the touch-up); that means that it is acceptable to have the 
nominal crossing time of the target postponed by up to ~18 hours (as consequence of a LEOP calibration 
maneuver) before getting a time penalty in comparison with the dog-leg strategy. A reasonable calibration 
maneuver of ~0.5m/s on LEOP (long enough to observe activation of the attitude control thrusters during 
the propulsion phase) would imply getting in target only ~13 hours later. 
 
Furthermore, the size of the required touch-up would be of few centimeters per second (~6cm/s, assuming 
1% error in the execution of the ~6.3m/s drift-stop maneuver with calibrated thrusters), while the size of 
the second maneuver in a dog-leg case would be muchlarger (~0.9m/s, 1/8 of the entire correction, taking 
into account also 5% underperformance in the execution of the first maneuver). The accuracy in 
acquisition of the target ground-track that can be expected by the touch-up is clearly larger. 
 
Finally, foreseen crossing time in case no LEOP maneuver was performed was in the middle of the night, 
and then the maneuvers, in case of dog-leg strategy, would have resulted in the late evening. A small 
adjustment would have permitted to set the crossing time at around the time foreseen for the routine 
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telecommand execution. In order to account for possible underperformance of the ESOC maneuver (no a 
priori calibration was used by ESOC), then the select d time for crossing the target ground-track was 
accordingly modified from ~13 to ~14 hours after the original crossing time without maneuver in LEOP. 
 
The following maneuver was then implemented by ESOC (single burn, as no need of correcting the 
eccentricity during LEOP was identified): 
•      1st burn: 2012/09/20-06:53:00.000; 0.539m/s 
 
4.2. Detailed calibration of LEOP maneuver 
 
Dynamic calibration of the LEOP maneuver performed by ESOC, based on direct comparison of the 
foreseen Delta-V with the one estimated through orbit determination, provided a quite high 
underperformance of ~5.5%. That value is larger than what expected from the analysis presented in 
paragraph 3.1, which makes it questionable for direct usage for the SIOV maneuvers. Moreover, the 
maneuver executed by ESOC during LEOP was remarkably shorter than those required in SIOV (~0.5m/s 
executed during LEOP versus around ~2 and ~4m/s required in SIOV). Therefore the impact of non linear 
parasitic thrusts is much more important.  
 
The following four Delta-V values were computed for the LEOP maneuver: 
1) Delta-V corresponding to the maneuver telecommand generated by ESOC (taking into account 
only the thrust provided by the propulsion thruster); as reference pressure the value measured in 
telemetry shortly before execution of the maneuver was considered. 
2) Delta-V corresponding to the integration of the force generated by the pulses provided by the 
satellite during the pure propulsion phase (including both propulsion and attitude control 
thrusters); same reference pressure as above was used. 
3) Delta-V corresponding to the integration of the force generated by the pulses provided by the 
satellite during the entire thrusting phase (including both propulsion and post maneuver 
stabilization phase); same reference pressure as above was used. 
4) Delta-V estimated through orbit determination. 
 
In Fig. 7 the pure propulsion phase (8 pulses at 8 
hertz from the propulsion thrusters) and the 
stabilization phases (individual pulses afterwards) 
can be clearly distinguished. 
 
The following parameters were then derived: 
A) Ratio between Delta-V (2) and Delta-V (1); 
efficiency of the propulsive system due to 
activation of attitude thrusters during the 
propulsion phase. 
B) Ratio between Delta-V (4) and Delta-V (3); 
efficiency of the propulsive system due to 
efficiency of the individual thrusters. 
C) Difference between Delta-V (3) and  
Delta-V (2); non-linear parasitic Delta-V 
caused by stabilization. 
 
Figure 7.  Pulses (per second) executed during  
LEOP maneuver 
 
The following was then observed: 
• Delta-V (1) differs from the target Delta-V selected by ESOC, being ~1.5% smaller; that is due to 
an large decrease of the pressure between ESOC reading, t entry in wheel attitude controlled 
mode, after earth pointing acquisition (18.8 bars) nd at maneuver execution time (18.5 bars).  
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• Efficiency (A) is ~99%; that means that ~1% of underperformance is caused by the activation of 
attitude thrusters during the propulsion phase, in line with expectations from paragraph 3.1 and 
much lower than for Metop-A (better alignment of the propulsion thruster with the satellite centre 
of mass). 
• Efficiency (B) is ~97.5%; the real force generated by the individual thrusters causes an 
underperformance of ~2.5%, much larger than what is observed for Metop-A (around 0.5%); it is 
unclear if that underperformance is linked with a lower mass flow being ejected or by a lower ISP 
than expected. This question can be answered only when a large enough fuel mass is spent, by 
cross-comparison between mass estimation based on pulse-count and on pressure-volume-
temperature method; if less mass flow is really taking place than expected the two estimation 
should diverge in an important manner. 
• Difference (C) is ~-3mm/s, very similar to what observed for Metop-A; that contributor is 
therefore responsible for an underperformance of the LEOP maneuver of ~0.5%. 
 
The real calibration scale factor to be used is then the product of efficiency (A) and efficiency (B), 
therefore around 96.5% corresponding to an underperformance of 3.5%.  
The 1.5% underperformance linked to the different pressure reading can be nullified by refreshing the 
pressure used for the telecommand generation shortly before up-link on-board.  
The -3mm/s of non linear Delta-V caused by the stabiliz tion shall be directly removed from the target 
Delta-V before telecommand generation. 
 
4.3. Selection of ground-track target for the drift-stop maneuver 
 
The goal of the SIOV maneuver is to stop the satellite when inside the operational 5km dead-band around 
its reference ground-track (generated by shifting Metop-A one by 14/29 of one orbit, as explained in Ref. 
[2]), and to ensure that it remains inside up to the end of the SIOV (so at least five weeks); as target 
crossing of the reference ground-track at the end of the SIOV is then selected. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Ground-track evolution without (left) and with (right) drift-stop maneuver 
 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the ground-track with and without drift stop maneuver; an enormous drift
of around 100km per day is observed, caused by the very large offset in semi-major axis with respect to 
the operational one (~12km lower). The drift-stop maneuver reduces that drift to around 0.1km per day;
the evolution remains very close to the reference ground-track (red and green curves represent the 
deviation at equatorial crossing) for the entire SIOV, being the deviation very small at the end of the
SIOV. That maximizes the probability of not exiting the dead-band during the entire SIOV. 
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The probability above is however quite small, as already an error of 1% on the drift-stop maneuver causes 
a residual drift of 1km per day, leading to exit of the dead-band within less than one week. Therefore a 
touch-up maneuver had been foreseen on the following day, to cancel out the effect of the drift-stop 
execution error; the target for the touch-up must be identical to the one selected for drift-stop, to ensure 
that the ground-track evolution remains as close as pos ible to the expected one and minimizing then t 
impact on the planned post-maneuver activities (the Metop mission planning system has a tolerance of 5 
seconds; if that limit is exceeded re-planning is needed). 
 
4.4. Selection of eccentricity target for the drift-stop maneuver 
 
During Metop-A operations a secular drift of the eccentricity vector away from the frozen eccentricity 
value has been observed; that is due to the not negligible radial parasitic Delta-V (~5% of the commanded 
value) provided by the platform when an inclination correction is implemented.  
 
That is coupled with the fact that inclination 
maneuvers are executed yearly; therefore between 
two inclination maneuver an integer number of 
librations of the eccentricity vector around the frozen 
value is observed (3, being the libration period of 4 
months), making the effect cumulative (see also Ref.
[3]). All that can be clearly observed in Fig. 9 (initial 
evolution close to center). 
 
It is foreseen for Metop-B to execute inclination 
maneuvers close to the autumn equinox, to maximize 
their efficiency, the first one being planned in 2013, 
one year after the launch; also for Metop-B it can be 
expected that the eccentricity will diverge in a 
similar manner, being the observed radial parasitic 
thrust very similar to the one of Metop-A.  
 
Figure 9.  Historical evolution of  
Metop-A eccentricity  
 
Initial eccentricity for Metop-B was then selected considering an expected drift of the eccentricity vector 
in the first three years of mission by [0.000088, 0.00 120], assuming the same yearly deviation as 
observed for Metop-A; as target eccentricity vector [-0.000218, 0.001030] was selected, being the frozen 
eccentricity vector [-0.000013, 0.001150]. 
 
4.5. Execution of the drift-stop maneuver 
 
In order to achieve the two targets described in paragr phs 4.3 and 4.4 the following two burns maneuver 
was planned: 
•      1st burn: 2012/09/27-13:10:18.482; 4.045m/s 
•      2nd burn: 2012/09/27-14:01:00.159; 2.198m/s 
 
This timeline was perfectly in line with standard routine commanding activities, as routine telecommand 
sets are generated with execution time at first ascending-node after 13:00; therefore no need of modifying 
the routine operational timeline was identified. 
The actual telecommand was computed on the same morning of the maneuver, based on the expected 
evolution of pressure; the tank heaters were switched-on autonomously the day before the maneuver, 
causing a remarkable pressure increase of 0.36 bars in le s than 24 hours. 
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The first maneuver presented a marginal overperformance of ~0.4%, caused by a much lower than 
expected activation of the attitude control pulses during the propulsion phase (efficiency (A) in paragraph 
4.2), probably due to the displacement of COM caused by solar array rotation; this phenomenon is not 
observed on Metop-A, where the misalignment of the propulsion thruster is much larger and thus the solar 
array impact is negligible in comparison. Nearly perfect execution was observed for the second maneuver 
(~0.1% underperformance); the response of the attitude system was perfectly as expected. 
The large thrusting underperformance observed for the LEOP maneuver (efficiency (B) in paragraph 4.2) 
was confirmed and estimated to be ~3% (even a bit higher); the same for the stabilization Delta-V, 
estimated to be 1mm/s (a bit lower than for the LEOP maneuver). 
 
Even if the overall performance was excellent (total error of ~0.3%) that was not sufficient to avoid 
violation of the dead-band during SIOV (exit after 3 weeks), as shown in Fig. 10 (left); a small touch- p 
maneuver was then needed. Eccentricity target is acquired nearly perfectly, as can be seen in Fig. 10 
(right); 4 month of libration (one cycle is shown). 
 
 
Figure 10.  Ground-track and eccentricity evolution after execution of the drift-stop maneuver 
 
4.6. Preparation and execution of the touch-up maneuver and target orbit acquisition 
 
To compensate for the execution error of the drift-stop maneuver the following maneuver was planned: 
•      1st burn: 2012/09/28-13:04:46.534; -0.015m/s 
 
That is the first maneuver against the velocity direction performed by Metop-B, therefore no calibration 
values are available; generation of a-priori calibrtion was performed as follow:  
• Efficiency (A) was computed from the number of attitude control pulses expected from the 
maneuver execution (procedure similar to what present d in paragraph 3.1); no pulse was 
expected, so 100% was used. 
• Efficiency (B) was computed from the data of the drift-stop maneuver (procedure similar to what 
presented in paragraph 4.2); the value 97% was used.
• Difference (C) was also computed from the data of the drift-stop maneuver (procedure similar to 
what presented in paragraph 4.2); the value -1mm/s was used. 
 
Also that maneuver performed very close to the expectation; 5% of overperformance (error less than 
1mm/s) was observed, mainly linked to a stabilization Delta-V higher than expected, probably caused by 
excitation of the solar array flexible modes induced by the small thrust. 
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Nevertheless, the observed post-maneuver 
evolution of the ground-track is more than 
satisfactory, as shown in Fig. 11; the satellite 
remains inside the dead-band for ~10 weeks.  
 
It was therefore possible to start SIOV 
operations on a perfect target orbit only 8 days 
after hand-over to EUMETSAT of the satellite 
after LEOP. 
 
5. Conclusion and lessons learned 
 
The main lessons learnt from the analysis 
performed to prepare the orbit acquisition of 
Metop-B and from the operations themselves 
can be so summarized: 
 
Figure 11.  Ground-track evolution after execution  
of the touch-up maneuver 
• A-priori calibration computation based on Montecarlo analysis seems to provide more than 
excellent results; however that does not take into account intrinsic underperformance of the 
propulsion system, which appears to be much larger than expected. 
• An alternative strategy for acquisition of the operational orbit was developed to cope with large 
injection error; this strategy is also applicable in other situations, when for instance not calibrated 
thrusters have to be used. Guidelines were defined to decide which strategy shall be preferred 
depending on the operational conditions.  
• A new SW module and dedicated procedures were developed for interference management; even 
if not used for Metop-B, they are now ready for Metop-C and can also be used for other missions 
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